In this paper, we utilized a sample of Italian companies to explore the influence of firms' Anti-Bribery and Corruption efforts on firm value. On a sample of 47 Italian listed companies followed by Asset4 (Thomson Reuters business collecting corporate social responsibility data) during period 2002 to 2013, we investigate the relevance of information related to firms' Anti-Bribery and Corruption efforts in explaining stock price through the accounting-based valuation model developed by Ohlson (1995) . Results corroborate empirical evidence of a positive correlation between efforts made by firms in avoiding bribery and corruption during operations (i.e., whether a company describes, claims to have or mentions processes in place to avoid Bribery and Corruption practices at all its operations) and stock price.
Introduction
In recent years, corporate financial disclosure has become one of the topics in accounting theory which is most often and most widely investigated. Corporate disclosure, defined as "any deliberate release of financial and non-financial information, whether numerical or qualitative, required or voluntary, through formal or informal channels" (Gibbins et al., 1990, p. 122) , is considered to be an important activity, as it facilitates communication between management and capital providers and is thought to mitigate information asymmetry problems and agency conflicts (Akerlof, 1970; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976) .
Recently, there has been a growing interest in corporate non-financial disclosure; that is, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reporting, which represents additional disclosures provided mainly on a voluntary base (see Dhaliwal et al., 2014 for an overview of different countries' rules on CSR reporting). CSR reporting has attracted a large amount of academic interest with a special concern on the role that such disclosures play in firm valuation (Moser and Martin, 2012) . During recent years, firms have demonstrated strong commitment in providing information regarding firms' environmental and social impact on society thus resulting in a higher level of social disclosures (see Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012) . In other words, an increasing number of companies have started to disclose non-financial information related to their commitment to environmental preservation, human rights protection, as well as employees and social welfare because it is wellrecognized that investors and intermediaries (i.e., buy and sell-side analysts) in capital markets increasingly integrate environmental, social and governance (ESG) data in their valuation models, creating demand for sustainability reporting (Eccles et al., 2011) . As a result, firms establish a positive corporate image throughout society, and this creates reputation capital which can reduce the threat of regulation (Maxwell et al., 2000) . However, there is social information that has been less investigated on a micro level which is strictly related to Bribery and Corruption.
With this term, even if it is not easy to define, we refer to "the act by which 'insiders' profit at the expense of 'outsiders' " (Evans, The cost of corruption 1 ), or commonly, the abuse of public power for private gain (e.g., Lapalombara, 1994; Habib and Zurawicki, 2002; Aguilera and Vadera, 2008; Alon and Hageman, 2013) . However, this does not mean that corruption exists only within public sector but in fact it is a practice that is well-embedded into the private business. That is the reason why during recent years, firms demonstrated a strong commitment in trying to reduce and avoid bribery and corruption in their operations.
However, even if it is well recognized that "Corruption is increasingly viewed as a significant impediment to economic development" (Healy and Serafeim, 2014, p. 2) , research on corruption has focused on its country level causes and consequences, leaving many questions unanswered at firm level (Healy and Serafeim, 2014) . Especially, while managers are likely to understand the impact that Bribery and Corruption might have on a firm's reputational capital, it is not clear whether investors are able to understand bribery incident can decrease firm competitiveness (Serafeim, 2013) . Therefore, starting from this premise, our study aims to investigate the value relevance of firms' Anti-Bribery and Corruption efforts on the Italian scenario. That is, based on the model of Ohlson (1995) which is considered to be the conventional approach used to examine value relevance of disclosure (i.e., nonfinancial information) in accounting-based market research -we investigate whether the market gives a relevance to information related to a firm's effort in eliminating Bribery and Corruption from its operations.
For the purpose of our research, we select an To explore the issues outlined above, the remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides a brief review of relevant literature, section 3 describes the nature of our data and the methods we employed, while results of our analyses are reported in section 4. Finally, we offer major findings, policy implications, and some concluding remarks in section 5
Literature review
The idea underpinning our paper is that if a company describes, claims to have or mentions processes in place to avoid Bribery and Corruption practices in all its operations this should be considered as a sort of firm's accountability and sustainability behavior. That is, firms disclose information on a voluntary base in order to obtain a benefit from a market perspective.
The empirical body of literature on disclosure features analyzes a range of issues, including the determinants of voluntary disclosure and compliance with regulations, the economic and market consequences of disclosure, and analyst coverage (Hassan and Marston, 2010) . Many researchers have argued that the possession and provision of highquality information may reduce the volatility of stock returns and the cost of equity, as well as increase firm value (Lambert et al., 2007; Lang et al., 2003) . In contrast to these positive outcomes, information disclosure has also been shown to have some negative effects. Specifically, information disclosed to competitors can increase costs of compliance, as well as costs associated with lost competitiveness (Hassan et al., 2009 ). Moreover, disclosure may enhance competitors' market positions and, as a result, damage a firm's competitiveness (Healy and Palepu, 2001) . Nevertheless, recent studies proved that firms engaged in CSR reporting generally take advantage of a lower cost of equity capital (Dhaliwal et However, this literature mostly focuses on CSR reporting, thus using overall score as a proxy of firm sustainability (i.e., KLD score) while, to the best of our knowledge, no previous studies apart from Healey and Serafeim (2014) focus attention on a firm's selfreported anticorruption efforts. Nevertheless, our study is different from that of Healy and Serafeim (2014) because we investigate the value relevance of firm's self-reported Anti-Bribery and Corruption efforts (i.e., if the company describes, claims to have or mentions processes in place to avoid Bribery and Corruption practices in all its operations) while their tests examine whether these forms of disclosure (firm's self-reported Anticorruption efforts) are real efforts to combat corruption or are worthless chatter (Healy and Serafeim, 2014, p. 1). Therefore, our study is the first attempt, to the best of our knowledge, that investigates the value relevance of such non-financial information. Drawing on the previous literature on CSR reporting, and considered that we consider firms' Anti-Bribery and Corruption efforts to be a sort of firms' social proactivity, it is our conjecture that this information should be positively correlated with stock market price.
Methodology and variables

Sample selection
For the purpose of our study, we select all the Italian companies covered by Asset4 during period 2002-2013 which are, respectively, the first and last data on bribery and corruption available on Asset4. As reported in the table below, from the initial sample, we removed those without: (a) accounting and market information and (b) Asset4 corruption information. As a result, we obtained a sample composed of 47 firms and 436 firm-year observations. 
Econometric model
In order to investigate the relevance of accounting and non-accounting information in explaining stock price, we adopt the accounting-based valuation model developed by Ohlson (1995) because it has become the conventional approach used to examine value relevance of disclosure (i.e., non-financial information) in accounting-based market research (Semenova et al., 2010 Regarding the time of dependent variable (DV), even if it is common in value-relevance research to use stock price after the release of the financial statements, the current study uses stock price at the end of the fiscal year as DV. In fact, according to Habib and Azim (2008, p. 172) "post-year events could add noise to the measurement process". Moreover, since our sample is made up of big Italian companies, which are large enough to be followed by analysts, we expect that that financial statement information became public before the financial statements were released.
Then, in order to strength our results, we substitute our variable B&C with other information available on Asset4 which provides an alternative measure of firms' anticorruption efforts. This is Bribery and Corruption training, B&C_T it, which is equal to 1 if firm i at time t trains its employees on the prevention of Corruption and Bribery, zero otherwise (Datastream code SOCODP008). We decided to adopt this measure as an alternative proxy of firm's efforts because differently from other information available on Asset4 (e.g., Community Reputation Policy Elements/Bribery and Corruption -SOCODP0017), this evidences that firms are effectively enforced in avoiding corruption in its operations. In other words, having an Anti-Bribery and Corruption policy per se does not represent an effort while on the contrary, it could figure out as an opportunistic (i.e., strategic) manager's decision or simply anything other than worthless chatter (Healy and Serafeim, 2014). Table 4 reports the main descriptive statistics for the entire sample. The mean (median) value of price is 10.54 € (6 €) with a mean (median) value of EPS and BPS, respectively, about 0.43 € (0.28 €) and 8.14 € (3.97 €). Further, on average during period [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] there is 50% of the sample disclose information regarding B&C while there are only 37.3% of trained employees on the prevention of Bribery and Corruption. Moreover, table 5 reports Spearman's correlation coefficients. As reported, B&C and B&C_T are correlated at 52% between and negatively correlated with Price while positively with EPS and BPS (however statistically not significant). Therefore, results reported in table 6 provides a clearer picture regarding the relevance of firms' Anti-Bribery and Corruption efforts. At a glance, the 2 values for all models are around 60%, indicating the good fitting of the model within the data. In particular, model (1), which is the result of application of the simple Ohlson (1995) model, provide evidence that the framework fits with the Italian data. The F-Statistic is significant in all cases, while multicollinearity does not affect our model, since the highest value is less than the threshold of 10 as proposed by Hair et al. (2009) . In model (2) we added our variable of interest (B&C) without any interaction with EPS and EBS. As we can see from the positive change of Adj-R 2 , this nonfinancial information is relevant in explaining stock price, and this information is positively correlated with the DV. That is, firms that describe, claim to have or mention processes in place to avoid Bribery and Corruption practices in all their operations have a level of price higher by 2.69 € with respect to those which not (p<0.1). Moreover, in model (3) we add the interaction terms of B&C with EPS and BPS in order to test whether this information influence accounting data (e.g., Cardamone et al., 2012) . As reported, the B&C term increases in magnitude and statistical significance; that is, if all factors are equal, then the stock price of a company which provides evidence of its effort in reducing bribery and corruption from all its operations is 5.25 € higher with respect to those which do not provide any information (significance level p<0.01). Interesting to note the value of the interaction terms: if B&C is positive then those firms experience a lower value of BPS (significance level p<0.01) and EPS (no statistical significance). In other words, 1 € of shareholders' equity translates into 0.396 € (0.667 -0.271) of market value for firms which provide evidence regarding B&C effort, meaning that stock prices are slightly related to firms' book value. Taken together this results allows us to confirm our initial conjecture that firms' evidence of Anti-Bribery and Corruption efforts are relevant and positively related with stock market prices. After, we strength our results by running our regression models (a) and (b) with a different horizon. That is, since as reported in table 4 there has been an increase in disclosure during 2007 we decided to drop all the observations before that date in order to test whether this influences our coefficients; as we can see from model (4) and (5), in table 6 the coefficient of B&C is still positive and statistically significant while there is a lack of significance on interaction terms of B&C and BPS (i.e. there is no differences in the value relevance of accounting variables between firms that disclose and not).
Results
As a last, we tested whether prices are influenced by B&C information by using a different proxy of firm's Anti-Bribery and Corruption effort, which is whether firms train their employees on the prevention of Bribery and Corruption. As can be seen, models 6 output confirms our previous result (i.e., model 3); that is we have, in both the situations, a positive relevance of a firm's effort in preventing Bribery and Corruption and that the interaction term with BPS is negative and statistically significant. As table 6 shows, the information regarding firms' anti-bribery and corruption efforts is relevant and positively correlated with stock market price (statistically significant) even when we add the interaction terms with accounting variables (i.e. EPS and BPS). However, the difference in significance of accounting variables due to the information disclosed is less robust to change in the time period analyzed while, at the same time, the coefficient of B&C maintain its positive and statistical significance even if we start the analysis in 2007. Moreover, in order to strengthen our results, we use an alternative proxy of firms' Anti-Bribery and Corruption efforts (i.e. B&C_T) and a different horizon of analysis and we find, in both situation, similar results; that is firms Bribery and Corruption efforts are positively correlated with stock market price.
Taken together our results provide empirical evidence that in the Italian scenario, firms' AntiBribery and Corruption efforts are rewarded and valued positively by the market. Therefore, managers should consider that any efforts made in avoiding Bribery and Corruption from their firm's operations are positively valued by the market. However, our results are sensitive to the horizon analyzed (i.e., 12 years) and the particular context (i.e., Italy). Finally, a limitation of our study is mainly that it investigates the relevance of information related to firms' AntiBribery and Corruption efforts without considering (i.e., controlling) for the quality of information disclosed, even if using a dichotomous variable allowed us to control for bias deriving from the lack of common standards. Future research should move in that direction; that is, the next analyses should focus on the role played by the quality of such information disclosed in mitigating information asymmetry with investors and intermediaries from other markets.
